AXIS HISTORY FORUM NORMANDY 90 DAYS PLUS

Tho there are a few fairly complete plans, written by the Brits. That's why at Casablanca Marshall wasn't talking about a May 43 Roundup, but some kind of operation against Brest in August. As it was in July 1942 Bolero was way behind schedule, starting over again in January 1943 would put you an additional 6 months further back. Even if the North African fighting ended in January, there' no time for Bolero to catchup to where it would need to be for a May 1943 invasion. When they decided to go with Torch the stream of shipping for Bolero was redirected to Torch. It isn't just a matter of tuning ships around at the end of January, and sailing them to the UK. They still thought Torch would cancel Roundup, because of the logistical, engineering, and air units, along with the shipping needed for Torch were diverted from the buildup for Roundup. The Axis reacted more strongly then they thought they would. When the Allies decided on Torch they assumed the Campaign would end quickly, and not last till May. Some adds up - much of it does not.Д¬lick to expand.Clearing North Africa in January doesn't solve the problem. I do not blindly take Hyperwar as an accurate source.

AXIS HISTORY FORUM NORMANDY 90 DAYS PLUS

I believe the necessity of replacing British combat casualties and replacing lost logistical assets at Tobruk does not require the use of 146,000 plus troop capacity throught the remainder of 1942 and a third of the way into 1943. There were considerable numbers of British troopships that never carried an American. troops on more than one transatlantic voyage. I also only cited British troopships used to transport U.S. were never reconstituted in the Middle East - meaning troops for that purpose were never sent. I also note that British formations lost at Tobruk - 32 (Army) Tank Brigade etc. Its shipping allocation was made prior to the Second Washington Conference. Prior to departure on 24 August 1942 it was diverted to Iraq because of the success of Case Blue in Russia. As with the previous two divisions, it was at sea when Churchill received news of the Tobruk disaster and in no way represented a subsequent diversion of British shipping.ДҐ6 (London) Division was ordered to India in June 1942. Again, this is not a reaction to the news Churchill received at the Second Washington Conference - nor does it reflect a subsequent diversion of British shipping.ДҐ1 (Highland) Division was ordered to India in May 1942, but its destination was changed to Egypt after it departed Great Britain on 16 June. This is not a reaction to the news Churchill received at the Second Washington Conference - nor did it reflect a subsequent diversion of British shipping.Д¤4 (Home Counties) Division was also ordered to Egypt in April 1942 and departed Great Britain on 29 May. The first elements of 23 Armoured Brigade arrived in Egypt on 8 July and were in combat only 14 days later. Sources: Nafziger/Jolson: 8 Armoured Division was ordered sent to Egypt in April 1942 and departed Great Britain on 8 May.

On the other hand, the preceding Hyperwar quote does not stand up to historical scrutiny. Consequently, the quote from Hyperwar ' For the time being, British participation in the BOLERO program virtually ceased' to be very accurate. The core of the argument was Marshall's belief the British were shoehorning the Americans into a Mediterranean Strategy at the expense of an invasion of France. It was in August 1942 - at the very end of the 'Transatlantic Essay Contest' between Marshall and Eisenhower which I cited earlier.

Axis history forum normandy 90 days